Memory Tagging: A Memory Efficient Design

ARM recently introduced a security feature called Memory Tagging Extension or MTE, which is designed to defend against common memory safety vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflow and use after free. In this paper, we examine three aspects of MTE. First, we survey how modern software systems, such as Glibc, Android, Chrome, Linux, and LLVM, use MTE. We identify some common weaknesses and propose improvements. Second, we develop and experiment with an architectural improvement to MTE that improves its memory efficiency. Our design enables longer memory tags, which improves the accuracy of MTE. Finally, we discuss a number of enhancements to MTE to improve its security against certain memory safety attacks.Comment: 16 Pages, 7 Figures. This version of the paper extends a shorter version submitted to IEEE Euro S&P'2

Proactive Refresh for Accountable Threshold Signatures

An accountable threshold signature (ATS) is a threshold signature scheme where every signature identifies the quorum of signers who generated that signature. They are widely used in financial settings where signers need to be held accountable for threshold signatures they generate. In this paper we initiate the study of proactive refresh for accountable threshold signatures. Proactive refresh is a protocol that lets the group of signers refresh their shares of the secret key, without changing the public key or the threshold. We give several definitions for this notion achieving different levels of security. We observe that certain natural constructions for an ATS cannot be proactively refreshed because the secret key generated at setup is needed for accountability. We then construct three types of ATS schemes with proactive refresh. The first is a generic construction that is efficient when the number of signers is small. The second is a hybrid construction that performs well for a large number of signers and satisfies a strong security definition. The third is a collection of very practical constructions derived from ATS versions of the Schnorr and BLS signature schemes; however these practical constructions only satisfy our weaker notion of security

Post-Quantum Single Secret Leader Election (SSLE) From Publicly Re-randomizable Commitments

A Single Secret Leader Election (SSLE) enables a group of parties to randomly choose exactly one leader from the group with the restriction that the identity of the leader will be known to the chosen leader and nobody else. At a later time, the elected leader should be able to publicly reveal her identity and prove that she is the elected leader. The election process itself should work properly even if many registered users are passive and do not send any messages. SSLE is used to strengthen the security of proof-of-stake consensus protocols by ensuring that the identity of the block proposer remains unknown until the proposer publishes a block. Boneh, Eskandarian, Hanzlik, and Greco (AFT\u2720) defined the concept of an SSLE and gave several constructions. Their most efficient construction is based on the difficulty of the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem in a cyclic group. In this work we construct the first efficient SSLE protocols based on the standard Learning With Errors (LWE) problem on integer lattices, as well as the Ring-LWE problem. Both are believed to be post-quantum secure. Our constructions generalize the paradigm of Boneh et al. by introducing the concept of a re-randomizable commitment (RRC). We then construct several post-quantum RRC schemes from lattice assumptions and prove the security of the derived SSLE protocols. Constructing a lattice-based RRC scheme is non-trivial, and may be of independent interest

Accountability for Misbehavior in Threshold Decryption via Threshold Traitor Tracing

A $t$-out-of-$n$ threshold decryption system assigns key shares to $n$ parties so that any $t$ of them can decrypt a well-formed ciphertext. Existing threshold decryption systems are not secure when these parties are rational actors: an adversary can offer to pay the parties for their key shares. The problem is that a quorum of $t$ parties, working together, can sell the adversary a decryption key that reveals nothing about the identity of the traitor parties. This provides a risk-free profit for the parties since there is no accountability for their misbehavior --- the information they sell to the adversary reveals nothing about their identity. This behavior can result in a complete break in many applications of threshold decryption, such as encrypted mempools, private voting, and sealed-bid auctions. In this work we show how to add accountability to threshold decryption systems to deter this type of risk-free misbehavior. Suppose a quorum of $t$ or more parties construct a decoder algorithm $D(\cdot)$ that takes as input a ciphertext and outputs the corresponding plaintext or $\bot$. They sell $D$ to the adversary. Our threshold decryption systems are equipped with a tracing algorithm that can trace $D$ to members of the quorum that created it. The tracing algorithm is only given blackbox access to $D$ and will identify some members of the misbehaving quorum. The parties can then be held accountable, which may discourage them from selling the decoder $D$ in the first place. Our starting point is standard (non-threshold) traitor tracing, where $n$ parties each holds a secret key. Every party can decrypt a well-formed ciphertext on its own. However, if a subset of parties ${\cal J} \subseteq [n]$ collude to create a pirate decoder $D(\cdot)$ that can decrypt well-formed ciphertexts, then it is possible to trace $D$ to at least one member of ${\cal J}$ using only blackbox access to the decoder $D$. Traitor tracing received much attention over the years and multiple schemes have been developed. In this work we develop the theory of traitor tracing for threshold decryption, where now only a subset ${\cal J} \subseteq [n]$ of $t$ or more parties can collude to create a pirate decoder $D(\cdot)$. This problem has recently become quite important due to the real-world deployment of threshold decryption in encrypted mempools, as we explain in the paper. While there are several non-threshold traitor tracing schemes that we can leverage, adapting these constructions to the threshold decryption settings requires new cryptographic techniques. We present a number of constructions for traitor tracing for threshold decryption, and note that much work remains to explore the large design space

Accountable Multi-Signatures with Constant Size Public Keys

A multisignature scheme is used to aggregate signatures by multiple parties on a common message $m$ into a single short signature on $m$. Multisignatures are used widely in practice, most notably, in proof-of-stake consensus protocols. In existing multisignature schemes, the verifier needs the public keys of all the signers in order to verify a multisignature issued by some subset of signers. We construct new practical multisignature schemes with three properties: (i) the verifier only needs to store a constant size public key in order to verify a multisignature by an arbitrary subset of parties, (ii) signature size is constant beyond the description of the signing set, and (iii) signers generate their secret signing keys locally, that is, without a distributed key generation protocol. Existing schemes satisfy properties (ii) and (iii). The new capability is property (i) which dramatically reduces the verifier\u27s memory requirements from linear in the number of signers to constant. We give two pairing-based constructions: one in the random oracle model and one in the plain model. We also show that by relaxing property (iii), that is, allowing for a simple distributed key generation protocol, we can further improve efficiency while continuing to satisfy properties (i) and (ii). We give a pairing-based scheme and a lattice-based scheme in this relaxed model